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“PAY TO PRESCRIBE”: A CASE FOR
STRENGTHENED ENFORCEMENT OF THE
FCPA IN THE GLOBAL PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY IN 2017 AND BEYOND
John “Jack” T. Jessee Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
Bribery is an unfortunate, albeit ubiquitous feature of the mod-
ern global economy. So long as there are government officials willing to
accept illicit payment in exchange for favors,1 there have been corpora-
tions willing to make illegal payments in order to gain some kind of
advantage over their competitors.2 Bribery undoubtedly exists the
world over, and runs the gamut from the richest nations to the poorest,
though developing nations have been among the hardest hit.3 Bribes
are solicited not only in exchange for routine work that otherwise
would not require a bribe, such as providing a company with utility
services without undue delay, but also to secure other, more seriously
unethical advantages such as improperly awarding government pro-
curement contracts.4
One industry that has been particularly rife with bribery is the
global pharmaceutical industry.5 While few, if any, economic sectors
have avoided becoming entangled with bribery entirely, pharmaceuti-
cal companies have frequently been investigated and charged under
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the chief anti-bribery legislation in
the United States.6 Pharmaceutical giants such as Avon, Merck, As-
* 3rd year student at The University of Richmond School of Law; Manuscripts
Editor, RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW AND BUSINESS.
1 Acceptance of bribery is unfortunately common, especially in developing nations
where government workers are often woefully underpaid. See Michael Johnston,
Poverty and Corruption, FORBES (Jan. 22, 2009), http://www.forbes.com/2009/01/
22/corruption-poverty-development-biz-corruption09-cx_mj_0122johnston.html.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Jonathan Webb, Why Pharma Faces So Many Corruption Allegations, FORBES
(Feb. 23, 2016), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jwebb/2016/02/23/why-pharma-faces-
so-many-corruption-allegations/#2db503601bd3; See also Jillian Claire Kohler et
al., Corruption in the pharmaceutical sector: Diagnosing the challenges, TRANS-
PARENCY INTERNATIONAL (2016), http://www.transparency.org.uk/publications/cor
ruption-in-the-pharmaceutical-sector/ (noting that “pharmaceuticals stands out as
a sub-sector that is particularly prone to corruption”).
6 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1, et seq. [hereinafter “FCPA”].
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traZeneca, Pfizer-Wyeth, Bristol-Meyers-Squibb, Eli Lilly, and myriad
others were all known to be under investigation by the DOJ for poten-
tial violations of the FCPA in 2012 alone.7 Further, as of 2014, two of
the top ten highest FPCA disgorgement8 payments of all time belong
to pharmaceutical giants Avon and Pfizer.9 Such extensive investiga-
tion and enforcement activity seems to indicate that U.S. anti-bribery
agencies feel that corruption is a very serious issue within the drug
industry, and that they are willing to commit significant resources to
prosecuting “Big Pharma.”
Several unique features of the pharmaceutical business are be-
lieved to create much of the industry’s FCPA-related trouble. Firstly,
participating in the global drug industry by nature requires a great
deal of contact with foreign officials, perhaps more so than most other
industries.10 Performing many critical pharmaceutical industry func-
tions, for example obtaining government regulatory approval for a new
drug, requires frequent and intimate contact with foreign government
officials.11 This frequent, close contact with government officials in
turn increases the temptation to bribe, as companies naturally seek to
achieve a more efficient and favorable regulatory approval process by
“buying off” officials.12 It is no secret that receiving regulatory ap-
proval to sell a drug in a given country is absolutely critical to success
in the pharmaceutical industry.13 Failure to do so can amount to cata-
strophic losses, as the research and development costs of that drug ef-
fectively go to waste if it does not receive regulatory approval for
consumption in a given country. Therefore, some pharmaceutical com-
panies have proven that they are willing to do almost anything to gain
7 Richard Cassin, The Corporate Investigations List (June 2012), THE FCPA BLOG
(Jul. 3, 2012), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/7/3/the-corporate-investigations-
list-june-2012.html.
8 Disgorgement refers to the mandatory re-payment of “ill-gotten gains” that were
earned as a result of bribery under the FCPA.
9 Richard Cassin, Avon Disgorgement Lands on Top Ten List, THE FCPA BLOG
(Dec. 26, 2014), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2014/12/26/avon-disgorgement-
lands-on-top-ten-list.html.
10 See Jillian Claire Cohen, Pharmaceuticals and corruption: a risk assessment,
WORLD BANK, http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corecourse2007
/Pharmaceuticals.pdf.
11 Id. at 77-78.
12 Id.
13 Andrew Ceresney, Director, SEC Div. of Enforcement, Remarks at CBI’s Phar-
maceutical Compliance Congress in Washington D.C., (March 3, 2015) (transcript
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2015-spch030315ajc.html#.VPX7Kka
SJxU).
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regulatory approval, and bribery is often the vehicle used to achieve
that end.14
Secondly, many nations other than the United States utilize a
public, nationalized healthcare system in which the government itself
is the chief provider of healthcare to its citizens. In this kind of health-
care system, doctors also double as public officials, as they are govern-
ment employees that also often wield considerable influence over the
general direction of the nation’s medical treatment, notably including
broad discretion over drug prescription policies.15 This means that the
FCPA anti-bribery provisions also govern corporate relationships with
doctors in a nationalized health system, as the FCPA’s text broadly
covers dealings with any “foreign official.”16
Such nationalized healthcare systems create even more oppor-
tunity for bribery to rear its ugly head. Doctors in a nationalized
healthcare system generally maintain wide discretion in deciding
which drugs to prescribe, meaning that drug companies can bribe pub-
lic doctors to prescribe their brand of drugs more often than necessary,
or prescribe them instead of a competitor’s drugs.17 These “kickback”
bribery payments to doctors, also known as “pay-to-prescribe” bribes,
are a very common source of corruption in the industry. These “pay to
prescribe” bribes are perhaps more insidious than bribes aimed at
cheating regulatory approval, as they often take the form of more dis-
creet, non-monetary gifts, such as luxurious, all-expenses-paid travel
under the guise of an “educational opportunity” or “reward programs”
for high-prescribing doctors.18 Further, “pay to prescribe” bribes can
often be harder for enforcement agencies to detect, due to their more
subtle nature.19 Because this sort of  “pay to prescribe” bribery has
become so commonplace in the modern era, it is the chief type of brib-
ery examined in this paper.
Regardless of the specific form the bribery takes or the exact
motives behind it, one thing remains clear—the pharmaceutical indus-
try has a very serious problem with bribery, and that problem contin-
ues today largely unabated.20 This is not to suggest however, that the
U.S. government has stood idly by while such behavior occurs. Govern-
ment enforcement agencies have indeed taken steps to curb improper
influence over prescribing, and have commenced several high-profile
enforcement actions against the industry in recent years. In 2015
14 Id.
15 Id; See also Cohen, supra note 10.
16 15 U.S.C. §78dd-1(A).
17 See Ceresney, supra note 13.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See generally Kohler, supra note 5.
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alone, the SEC prosecuted multiple high-level FCPA violations
throughout Big Pharma, including judgments against household
names like Bristol-Meyers-Squibb.21 Unfortunately, however, even
these enforcement actions have not eradicated bribery from the phar-
maceutical industry, as corruption offenses continue to occur to this
day.22
Noting this problem, this paper will use these recent FCPA en-
forcement actions to argue that a revamped and increased enforce-
ment of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions in the pharmaceutical
industry will be an absolutely critical task in 2017 and beyond, as
there is much work to be done in cleaning up the industry. The paper
will begin by outlining a brief history of the FCPA and examining its
basic enforcement provisions. It will then examine the nature of the
pharmaceutical industry’s bribery through a detailed analysis of sev-
eral recent high profile enforcement cases within the industry. Lastly,
the paper will propose several policy prescriptions as to what changes
might be made to the current FCPA enforcement regime in order to
continue eradicating bribery within Big Pharma.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FCPA AND ITS ENFORCEMENT
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (“FCPA”), though
now enforced the world over, was initially enacted as a mostly sym-
bolic piece of legislation.23 The law was in large part passed to show
that the U.S. Government was responding appropriately to the high-
profile corruption incidents of the era, namely President Nixon’s
Watergate Scandal.24 The SEC and other government agencies were
concerned not just with the infamous Watergate Hotel break-in, but
also the discovery of numerous illegal political contributions that
Nixon was found to have received in the aftermath of his impeachment
and resignation.25 Discovery of these suspicious payments to Nixon led
to further investigation, and SEC officials soon uncovered that many
corporations were using extensive webs of secret bank accounts for il-
21 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Exchange Act Release No. 76073, SEC File No. 3-
16881 (Oct, 5, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/34-76073.pdf.; See
also Richard Cassin, Bristol-Meyers-Squibb Pays $14 Million to Resolve China
FCPA Offenses, THE FCPA BLOG (Oct. 5, 2015), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/
2015/10/5/bristol-myers-squibb-pays-14-million-to-resolve-china-fcpa-o.html.
22 See Johnston, supra note 1 (discussing the 2016 anti-bribery raid on Novartis’
South Korea Operations, and noting that, “This is a structural problem within the
industry. . . Corruption will persist. . .”)
23 Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 1977-
2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89, 90 (2010).
24 Id. at 92.
25 Id. at 93.
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licit purposes.26 Further, investigators soon found that these same in-
visible corporate accounts that were used to curry favor with the Nixon
administration were also used to make extensive bribes abroad, as the
trail of illicit payments could be linked to many foreign officials as
well.27 Recognizing this very serious problem of secret “slush funds”
and extensive use of hard-to-trace bribery payments, Congress passed
the FCPA.28 The FCPA set out to ban giving anything of value (or even
promising to give something of value) to a foreign official in exchange
for influence, inducement, or improper advantage.29 The FCPA’s lan-
guage was groundbreaking in that it not only prohibited this kind of
bribery as it pertained to U.S. officials, but rather sought to ban brib-
ery anywhere in the world, by intentionally utilizing the term “foreign
official” to criminalize bribery regardless of the locale.30
However, though the FCPA featured very strong and idealistic
language, the law laid mostly dormant for over two decades. The gov-
ernment only brought a handful of minor enforcement cases before
1998, a year in which the law saw several key amendments that in-
creased its scope.31 The reasons behind the curious lack of initial en-
forcement of the FCPA are complex, but in general stem from the law’s
initially symbolic intent—the act was likely passed to allow the gov-
ernment to show that it was “tough” on bribery and appease the post-
Watergate public outcry for reform without requiring the government
to commit the immense resources required to properly enforce the
act.32 Further, the United States was for quite some time the only na-
tion with a global anti-bribery ban on its books, and so U.S. companies
complained that actually enforcing the law was “bad business” and
would place them at a distinct competitive disadvantage relative to
foreign competitors.33 Apparently heeding this concern, the U.S. Gov-
ernment appeared to “look the other way” regarding foreign corporate
corruption for many years.34
The FCPA’s period of dormancy, however, met an abrupt end in
the early 2000’s, when the U.S. government began to enforce the act
with great vigor and severity.35 Emboldened by a new global anti-brib-
ery norm (which arose after other nations began to acknowledge the
economic havoc that bribery was causing in their countries), the
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 15 U.S.C. §78dd-1(a).
30 Id.
31 Bixby, supra note 23, at 103.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 98.
34 Id at 99-102.
35 Id. at 104.
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strengthened financial transparency norms of the Sarbanes-Oxley era,
and also newfound concerns that bribery slush funds could be used to
finance global terrorism, U.S. enforcement agencies began to aggres-
sively prosecute FCPA violations at a rate that would have been
unimaginable only a few years prior.36 This exponential increase in
prosecution has continued to the present day, bringing us to the mod-
ern era of FCPA enforcement, where most companies now actively fear
potential FCPA prosecution and take great pains to implement effec-
tive anti-bribery compliance systems.37 Overall, the FCPA in the mod-
ern era is one of the U.S. government’s chief tools in combating white
collar and corporate crime, and wields a formidable anti-bribery en-
forcement scheme.
Interestingly, however, even the new, more fearsome era of
FCPA enforcement features a fairly glaring loophole—the “grease pay-
ments” exception.38  While making a gift to a foreign official to secure
favors is of course banned by the FCPA, making that same gift to “ex-
pedite a routine government action,” (i.e. a “facilitating payment” or
“grease payment”) is actually allowed under the current prevailing in-
terpretation of the law.39 This means that an otherwise illegal bribe
paid to ensure that, for example, a foreign government keeps a com-
pany’s utilities operating as normal or provides the usual police protec-
tion during periods of domestic unrest, is perfectly legal under the
FCPA because such activities are “routine.”40 The problem with such a
loophole, of course, is that it inherently blurs the contours between a
“facilitating payment” and an illegal bribe. To date, the exact bounda-
ries of that line are still unclear, and so the current landscape of FCPA
enforcement is somewhat muddled—while companies certainly fear
FCPA repercussions and most actively seek to ensure compliance, the
relatively ambiguous text of the law and the current “grease payment
loophole” make perfect compliance very difficult.41
This ambiguity in large part contributes to the problem to-
day— despite FCPA enforcement, bribery is still an ongoing issue, es-
pecially in the pharmaceutical industry. Therefore, subsequent
sections of this paper will examine this extensive bribery within the
pharmaceutical industry using several recent, high profile settlements
as a case study.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 109.
38 15 U.S.C. §78dd-1(a); Rebecca Koch, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: It’s
Time to Cut Back the Grease and Add Some Guidance, 28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 379, 380 (2005).
39 See Koch, supra note 38, at 380-81.
40 Id. at 385-86.
41 Id. at 89.
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III. BRIBERY IN BIG PHARMA AND THE FCPA
It is well established that bribery has long been a serious issue
plaguing the pharmaceutical industry, and in recent years, it appears
that this general maxim has not changed much, if at all.42 In fact, as
recently as October of 2015, Bristol-Meyers-Squibb ran afoul of the
FCPA due to the activities of its Chinese subsidiaries and was forced
to pay fines to the SEC.43 Therefore, it is clear that though FCPA en-
forcement has perhaps reached its highest levels ever, much work re-
mains to be done in cleaning up the pharmaceutical industry in
particular.44 This section of the paper will examine three recent high-
profile pharmaceutical enforcement actions that have occurred be-
tween 2012 and 2015—- the actions brought against Pfizer-Wyeth, Eli
Lilly, and Bristol-Meyers-Squibb. These cases were chosen to illus-
trate several unique bribery issues inherent in the modern Big
Pharma landscape—a landscape that hinges on utilizing a mixture of
secrecy, clever accounting tricks, and legal loopholes to maintain ille-
gal bribery practices. Further, each case provides an excellent insight
into the workings of the ubiquitous “pay to prescribe” bribery scheme,
which is seemingly the bribery method of choice in modern Big
Pharma.45
A. FCPA Enforcement Action Against Pfizer-Wyeth
Beginning chronologically with the earliest case of the trio—-
the FCPA enforcement action against Pfizer-Wyeth (hereafter “Pfi-
zer”), it is immediately clear that all is not well in the world of Big
Pharma. Pfizer, one of the largest drug companies in the world, was
found to have bribed doctors and other health officials in over half a
dozen countries, spanning much of the old Soviet Bloc (Bulgaria, Croa-
tia, the Czech Republic, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Serbia), as well as
Italy.46 For its crimes, Pfizer paid a $60M civil settlement to the SEC,
$15M in criminal penalties to the DOJ, and disgorged over $44M in
illegally earned profits.47
The Pfizer case hinged on the company’s fairly egregious use of
a “pay to prescribe” scheme, in which the Pharma giant provided both
direct and indirect payments to doctors around the globe in exchange
42 See Webb, supra note 5.
43 See Cassin, supra note 21.
44 See Bixby, supra note 23, at 104-16.
45 See Ceresney, supra note 13.
46 See Pfizer Inc., Wyeth LLC, SEC Accounting & Auditing Enforcement Release
No. 3399, https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22438.htm (Aug. 7,
2012).
47 Id.
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for prescribing or otherwise promoting Pfizer products.48 Further,
these payments were disguised using a system of false accounting,
which buried the illegal payments within the company’s books by dis-
guising them as benign expenses like travel, promotional activities,
and marketing.49 This is an excellent example of the common “pay to
prescribe” scheme, and shows the complex financial arrangements
that are often used to conceal funds used for bribery.50 Admittedly, the
use of secret bribery “slush funds” is nothing new, and is in fact quite
similar to the practices that gave rise to the initial passage of the
FCPA.51 But, in the new post-Sarbanes-Oxley accounting world that
features much stricter reporting and transparency requirements, the
exact methods of bribery appear to have adapted to become much more
sophisticated and subtle. The methods used by Pfizer and others
seems to indicate that due to the newly increased financial trans-
parency requirements of the 21st century, corporations have learned
to bury bribery funds even more deeply within their sprawling finan-
cial statements in order to avoid detection. This trend is worrisome, as
it indicates that rather than genuinely seeking to comply with the
FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, many actors in the pharmaceutical in-
dustry are instead finding increasingly clever workarounds to stay one
step ahead of regulators.
B. FCPA Enforcement Action Against Eli-Lilly
The second major enforcement action examined by this paper is
the FCPA action against another U.S.-based Pharma giant, Eli Lilly,
which was found to have violated FCPA provisions in Russia, Brazil,
China, and Poland, for a period of over fifteen years.52 For its crimes,
Eli Lilly paid a $29M settlement to the SEC.53 The Lilly case is partic-
ularly illuminating and pertinent to this study, as it featured a per-
haps even more shocking example of “pay to prescribe” bribery
spanning nearly the entire globe.54 In Russia, for example, Lilly’s sub-
sidiary paid millions of dollars into a suspicious “marketing agree-
48 Richard L. Cassin, Pfizer, Wyeth Pay $60M in Settlement, FCPA BLOG (Aug. 7,
2012), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/8/7/pfizer-wyeth-pay-60-million-in-set
tlement.html.
49 Id.
50 See Ceresney, supra note 13.
51 See generally Bixby, supra note 23.
52 See Eli Lilly & Co., SEC Lit. Release No. 22576, https://www.sec.gov/litigation/
litreleases/2012/lr22576.htm (Dec. 20, 2012); See also Richard Cassin, Eli Lilly
Pays $29 Million in SEC Settlement, THE FCPA BLOG (DEC. 20, 2012), http://
www.fcpablog.com/blog/2012/12/20/eli-lilly-pays-29-million-in-sec-settlement
.html.
53 Eli Lilly & Co., SEC Lit. Release, supra note 51.
54 Id.
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ment” account, which in a nutshell paid money to those loyal to
promoting Lilly’s products.55 Further, in China, Lilly’s subsidiary used
a slightly different “pay to prescribe” scheme, this time making direct
gifts to doctors in the form of spa treatments, jewelry, and other imper-
missible benefits.56 Though the gifts themselves were somewhat more
brazen and obvious, Lilly again took great pains to hide the illicit pay-
ments within its books.57 In Brazil and Poland, payments were made
to get Eli Lilly drugs on government-approved prescription reimburse-
ment lists, which would have significantly increased its market share
by allowing more government-insured patients to acquire their
drugs.58
Lilly’s actions are again highly suggestive of a serious problem.
Because of the public healthcare systems in nearly all of the countries
where it committed FCPA violations, Lilly knew that it could influence
the public doctors to prescribe its drugs using various gifts and pay-
ments, and did so flagrantly for the better part of two decades. Taken
as a whole, the Lilly case shows the lengths to which Pharma giants
are willing to go in order to ensure that their products survive stiff
competition in public health systems. The Lilly incident further indi-
cates that the current system is structured in such a way that making
bribery payments can be so lucrative and beneficial to Pharma compa-
nies that they are willing to risk monetary loss, damage to their repu-
tation, or even more serious criminal penalties because the rewards
outweigh the perceived risks.
C. FCPA Enforcement Action Against Bristol-Meyers-Squibb
The final case examined in this paper is the FCPA enforcement
action levied against Bristol-Meyers-Squibb (hereafter “BMS”) for vio-
lations that occurred within its Chinese subsidiary from 2009-2014.59
For its violations, BMS was assessed around $14M in total penalties
by the SEC.60 Here, BMS’s violation was quite similar to those com-
mitted by Eli Lilly and Pfizer—the company allowed its Chinese sub-
sidiary to dispense cash payments, lavish gifts, travel, entertainment,
and other improper gifts to Chinese doctors in exchange for prescrip-
tion referrals.61
The parallels to the Lilly and Pfizer cases do not end there—
BMS was also found to have used a great deal of financial trickery,
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. SEC Lit. Release, supra note 21.
60 Id.; See also Cassin, supra note 21.
61 Id.
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including faking invoices, receipts, and purchase orders to disguise the
illegally dispensed funds.62 This is yet another excellent example of
the sophisticated and subtle tactics that define modern pharmaceuti-
cal bribery. It seems that the days when a person might brazenly ap-
proach an official with a suitcase full of cash are over.  Unfortunately,
the same process is still being carried out in other ways. Now, a would-
be briber must use sophisticated accounting techniques, extensive se-
crecy, and a great deal of discretion in bribing. Thus, the modus oper-
andi has changed, but the root of the problem is the same.
Taken collectively, these case studies reveal that there remains
a very strong incentive to bribe within the pharmaceutical industry,
even in the face of potentially serious consequences. Though BMS, for
example, saw two of its competitors punished under the FCPA for
nearly identical practices in the two years prior to its own prosecution,
it did not act to clean up its own transgressions, and instead wound up
facing an FCPA enforcement action of its own.63 It is therefore quite
puzzling that pharmaceutical companies appear to be engaging in the
much the same behavior as before, apparently in complete disregard of
the punishments levied upon their competitors for committing the ex-
act same offenses.
Though there are many possible inferences one might draw
from this somewhat bleak state of affairs, one reasonable conclusion is
that international bribery remains an ongoing and severe issue within
the pharmaceutical industry, and that it will continue unless signifi-
cant changes are made. Thus, this paper will proceed by arguing that
reforms must be made to the current anti-bribery legal structure in
order to rectify this situation.
IV. THE CASE FOR REVAMPED AND STRENGTHENED FCPA
ENFORCEMENT IN BIG PHARMA:  PRESCRIPTIONS FOR 2017 AND BEYOND
Even a cursory glance at the case studies discussed in Section
III reveals that bribery remains a very serious, ongoing issue within
Big Pharma. The fact that three of the world’s leading drug-makers,
whose names are so ubiquitous as to be featured in medicine cabinets
around the world, were prosecuted for violations in the past four years
alone is a very troubling statistic. The obvious conundrum is thus how
the U.S. enforcement agencies ought to respond. This section will
make several prescriptions as to how a more robust FCPA enforcement
regime should proceed against pharmaceutical corporations.
I will begin with a brief overview of the penalties and remedies
available under the current FCPA regime. The main remedy available
to government enforcement agents under the FCPA is to impose mone-
62 Id.
63 Id.
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tary fines on violators, including a disgorgement of any profits that
were illegally earned as a result of the bribery.64 In assessing such
fines, the SEC and DOJ give great weight to the company’s degree of
cooperation, and the enforcement agencies give significant “coopera-
tion credit” for genuine, fulsome, and pre-emptive cooperation by the
corporation.
In determining an appropriate dollar value for such fines, it
appears that government agencies generally defer to the U.S. sentenc-
ing guidelines, which prescribe a broad range of permissible fines
based on a number of factors.65 Issues taken into consideration include
the number of employees in the organization; whether high-level per-
sonnel were involved in or condoned the conduct; prior criminal his-
tory; whether the organization had a pre-existing compliance and
ethics program; voluntary disclosure; cooperation; and acceptance of
responsibility.66
Imprisonment for a period of up to 5 years is also possible in
cases where the FCPA violation can be readily attributed to an indi-
vidual actor.67 The current enforcement regime thus chiefly consists of
levying monetary fines, buttressed by a system of self-reporting and
corporate cooperation, as well as imprisonment for individual offend-
ers. Further, it appears that the current regime offers enforcement
agencies rather wide discretion in determining appropriate penalties,
as the system is characterized by a system of broad guidelines rather
than specific prescriptions.
I argue that this basic array of penalties under the FCPA is
largely sound, but I propose two incremental policy changes that Con-
gress, the SEC, and the DOJ might implement in a “perfect world.”
Factors such as political gridlock, lobbying efforts on behalf of the
pharmaceutical industry, and other real-world constraints such as
budget and manpower shortages might prevent these changes from be-
ing perfectly implemented as described. The purpose, therefore, is to
simply inject potentially promising ideas into the public debate over
how the U.S. might improve its anti-bribery regime in 2017 and be-
yond. With this disclaimer in mind, I argue that Congress, as well as
the SEC and the DOJ, should make two fairly modest changes to the
64 15 U.S.C. §78ff (2002).
65 THE FCPA PROFESSOR, HOW ARE FCPA FINES, PENALTIES, AND SENTENCES CAL-
CULATED?, http://fcpaprofessor.com/fcpa-101.
66 Id.
67 Id.; While imprisonment is an effective deterrent as to individual conduct, this
paper focuses chiefly on policy at the firm level. For more on individual criminal
sentencing under the FCPA, see generally Warin & Speice, Go Directly to Jail:
Sentencing of Individual Criminal Defendants in Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Cases, 1 BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS: RISK & COMPLIANCE No. 6, http://www.gibson
dunn.com/publications/Documents/Warin-FCPAByline.pdf.
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FCPA and its enforcement protocol that will provide a significant boost
to their efforts in the war against bribery in Big Pharma.
Firstly, I posit that the enforcement agencies ought to substan-
tially increase the dollar-value of fines, disgorgement payments, and
other damages that are assessed in FCPA cases involving pharmaceu-
tical companies. Second, I argue that Congress should amend the
FCPA to remove the “grease payment” loophole, as the current law is
simply too ambiguous, and thus encourages “borderline” behavior that
is still effectively bribery.68 I further argue that these prescriptions
work symbiotically, and in fact their efficacy would likely be enhanced
if both were implemented simultaneously.
A. Increase Fines and other Monetary Penalties for Pharmaceutical
Companies under the FCPA
My first policy prescription is that enforcement agencies ought
to substantially increase the monetary value of fines, damages, and
disgorgement payments that are assessed for FCPA violations in the
pharmaceutical industry. Given the wide sentencing discretion that is
already afforded to the enforcement agencies,69 this change could
likely be accomplished by merely altering internal regulatory policy,
avoiding the more arduous task of amending the FCPA itself. This rec-
ommendation is admittedly quite simple, but could nonetheless be
very effective in reducing bribery within the industry, as I argue that
the current level of fines assessed is simply not sufficient to act as an
effective deterrent.70
A quick glance at the financial statements of the three compa-
nies examined by this paper—Eli Lilly, Pfizer-Wyeth, and Bristol-
Meyers-Squibb— reveals that each earns well in excess of $5B in prof-
its each year, and some earned much more. The giant Pfizer exceeded
an eye-popping $22B in profits in 2013.71 Yet, for their fairly flagrant
68 See Koch, supra note 38.
69 See FCPA Professor, supra note 65.
70 This paper originally argued that enforcement agencies should not only in-
crease the range of monetary penalties under the FCPA, but also proportionately
increase the value of benefits available to good faith cooperating corporations
under the cooperation credit system. While this paper was being edited for publi-
cation, the DOJ did indeed implement such an overhaul to the cooperation credit
system in a new one-year pilot program. Because this policy has already been en-
acted, the argument has largely been omitted. See Jonathan R. Barr et al., DOJ
Attempts to Encourage Corporate Self-Disclosures With the Announcement of a
One-Year FCPA Pilot Program, BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP, available at https://
www.bakerlaw.com/alerts/doj-attempts-to-encourage-corporate-self-disclosures-
with-the-announcement-of-a-one-year-fcpa-pilot-program.
71 Richard Anderson, Pharmaceutical Industry Gets High on Fat Profits, BBC
NEWS (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/business-28212223.
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FCPA violations, the trio was fined only $29M, $60M, and $19M, re-
spectively.72 While these settlement figures may appear quite robust
to the lay reader, it is apparent that these fines are insufficient when
they are weighed against the enormous sums that these pharmaceuti-
cal corporations earn in profits each year— in my opinion, a true “drop
in the bucket” that does not constitute a genuine threat to their ability
to conduct ongoing operations. Thus, I argue that these fines are sim-
ply not substantial enough to act as an effective deterrent to bad corpo-
rate behavior— it is not hard to imagine an executive “shrugging off” a
$20M fine as merely a “bad day” when the company that they lead
earns many times that amount in a given week.
The relatively modest fines assessed under the current system
create a dangerous calculus for those within the pharmaceutical indus-
try. Clearly, at least some Big Pharma executives that are engaging in
a cost-benefit analysis of whether to commit a potentially illegal act
feel that they are better off skirting the FCPA’s rules, or even fla-
grantly violating them in some cases, as evidenced by the industry’s
continuing violations despite the known risks of an enforcement ac-
tion. Though we obviously cannot know their subjective mindsets for
certain, it is not unreasonable to conclude that many pharmaceutical
industry actors have simply determined that the potential profits
earned by “bribing to the top” of a given market in most cases far ex-
ceed the middling fines that the SEC or DOJ might assess, even when
considering that all profits earned as a result of the bribery must theo-
retically be disgorged.
To date, only one fine levied against a pharmaceutical company
under the FCPA is featured on the FCPA Blog’s “Top 10” list, which
compiles the largest FCPA settlements to date, as of the end of 2016.73
That statistic is puzzling, given that the level of bribery in the phar-
maceutical industry is notoriously high, and that the giant companies
within the industry could certainly afford to pay larger fines.74 Fines
similar to the record FCPA damages paid by telecom giants Siemens
($800M) and Alstom ($772) or those levied against oil titan Hallibur-
ton/KBR ($579M) seem wholly appropriate for very serious FCPA vio-
lations, and given that pharmaceutical companies are in the same
financial “ballpark” as those companies that received some of the larg-
est fines ever, it seems necessary to increase fines toward that range.75
72 See Cassin, supra notes 21, 48, 52.
73 See Richard Cassin, Teva Announces $519m Settlement, FCPA BLOG (Dec. 22
2016), http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2016/12/22/teva-announces-519-million-fcpa-
settlement.html (discussing Teva Pharmaceuticals’ $519M FCPA fine in Decem-
ber 2016, good for the fourth highest penalty on the FCPA Blog’s “top ten” list.
Prior to this settlement, however, no pharmaceutical fines had cracked the top 10.)
74 Anderson, supra note 71.
75 Id.
94 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 16:2
Thus, this first policy prescription essentially acknowledges
the obvious—Big Pharmaceutical companies are some of the wealthi-
est corporations in the world by almost any measure, and in fact boast
the highest profit margins of any industry.76 Therefore, if the SEC and
the DOJ are seeking to “scare” the pharmaceutical industry into FCPA
compliance, they must substantially increase the potential punish-
ments that they may administer, or “become scarier,” for lack of a bet-
ter term.
In sum, I argue that the law must quickly adapt to remove any
incentives whatsoever to bribe in the pharmaceutical industry. A sim-
ple, yet effective step towards that goal is to increase fines and other
damages. As it stands, the law is inadvertently tempting pharmaceuti-
cal actors to bribe, as the profits that can be realized in doing so often
outweigh the relatively modest fines that have been assessed to date.
Once the financial calculus of deciding whether to bribe is changed, it
follows logically that actors within the pharmaceutical industry will
have to think much harder before deciding to violate the FCPA.
B. Close the “Grease Payment” Loophole
A second, and perhaps more ambitious suggestion, is to close
the “grease payment” or “facilitating payment” loophole that is cur-
rently plaguing FCPA enforcement.77 Generally speaking, the “grease
payment” loophole refers to a provision of the FCPA that actually per-
mits certain small acts of bribery—i.e., a “facilitating or expediting
payment” to a foreign official in order to secure a “routine governmen-
tal action.”78 This exception is technically limited to small payments
that are made to ensure delivery of “ordinary” government services,
which encompasses granting permits and visas, providing police pro-
tection, mail service, prompt inspections, utility services, or any “rou-
tine” other services “of a similar nature.”79  However, I argue that the
“grease payment” loophole must be closed because it can poison an ex-
ecutive’s decision-making process and inadvertently incentivize brib-
ery, merely by acknowledging the existence of a permissible category
of bribery.
I note that this suggestion has already been the subject of con-
siderable scholarship, and that the subject likely merits a paper or
book of its own.80 Further, many other Western anti-bribery regimes,
such as the UK Bribery Act, have already taken steps to remove any
“facilitating payment” language from their statutes, and have moved
76 Id.
77 15 U.S.C. §78dd-1(a); See Koch, supra note 38.
78 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b).
79 Id.
80 See generally Koch, supra note 38.
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to categorically ban bribery of any sort.81 I also note that implement-
ing this suggestion would most likely require Congress to amend the
FCPA itself, rather than merely change regulatory directives, admit-
tedly increasing the difficulty of enacting such a policy. Therefore, I
will address this suggestion as narrowly as possible, solely as it per-
tains to alleviating the current bribery issues in the pharmaceutical
industry.
The mere existence of a category of “permissible” bribery cre-
ates a dangerous and false dichotomy. If bribery of all stripes was
made categorically illegal—regardless of whether the favor being solic-
ited is “routine” or not, it stands to reason that most companies would
know that they ought to steer clear of the practice entirely. But, the
current loophole that legally permits some bribes, but not others, natu-
rally encourages actors to push the limits of “permissible” bribery as
far as possible. Pharma executives know that if they can somehow con-
strue their actions as being within the safe harbor of a “grease pay-
ment,” they are generally safe from FCPA enforcement.82 Worse, many
of the government activities that pharmaceutical industry actors pay
bribes in exchange for might readily be construed as “routine”—is a
payment made to entice a doctor to prescribe a drug really any differ-
ent than one made to an official to ensure that a company will be af-
forded proper police protection? While the answer to the former is less
clear, the latter action is in fact explicitly permitted as a “facilitating
payment” under the statute. This false distinction opens the door for
pharmaceutical executives to assert that their more flagrant bribery is
permissible as well, as it could be argued to be “of a similar nature.”83
Thus, it is evident that engaging in this sort of line drawing as
to which bribes are allowed is inherently problematic. Allowing some
kinds of bribes and not others fatally undermines the powerful moral
argument that bribery of any sort is simply wrong. Permitting some
bribes can instead portray bribery as a “sliding scale” of wrongs, with
some types of bribery arbitrarily deemed more acceptable than
others.84 Thus, I argue that a categorical ban on all types of bribery,
regardless of whether a payment is intended as a “facilitating pay-
ment” or not, is absolutely necessary to move towards a bribery-free
pharmaceutical industry.
81 See Ben Hallman, Bribery Law Loophole Leads to Confusion and Abuse, Law-
yers Say, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 26, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/
04/26/bribery-law-walmart-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-loophole_n_1450474.ht
ml.
82 Id.
83 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b).
84 Id.
96 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 16:2
This recommendation works in conjunction with my proposal
to increase monetary fines outlined in subsection “A.” If both proposed
changes were put in place simultaneously, the anti-bribery landscape
in Big Pharma would look quite a bit different. In such a world, the
calculus of deciding whether to bribe will have drastically changed.
Executives would appreciate that all bribery is illegal, regardless of its
type; that fines for committing this bribery would be so punitive as to
be extremely dangerous to their companies’ ongoing viability; and that
they could self-report any good-faith violations that do occur or “whis-
tle-blow” without hesitation.85 In this new world, bribery as a whole
would simply appear to be a less appealing option, and so it follows
logically that corruption within the pharmaceutical industry would in
turn be reduced. Facing a new set of rules, I argue that far fewer phar-
maceutical actors would be tempted to bribe, and a degree of normalcy
could return to the industry.
V. CONCLUSION
It is now widely accepted that bribery is a truly damaging prac-
tice that has far-reaching negative effects on the modern global econ-
omy.86 Bribery causes market distortions, reduces economic output,
and undermines faith in a democratic, capitalist society.87 Bribery
even creates dangerous and occasionally lethal situations:  shoddily-
built skyscrapers and bridges have collapsed in nations such as Tur-
key and China after building inspectors were bribed to look the other
way and expedite construction.88 It is therefore critical that the U.S.
government implement and enforce as robust an international anti-
bribery regime as possible.
Though the FCPA has risen to achieve unprecedented levels of
anti-bribery enforcement around the globe, and compliance with the
law appears to be increasing on the whole, the pharmaceutical indus-
try seems to be particularly resistant to its reaches, as similar viola-
tions occur within the industry year after year.89 Therefore, it is
abundantly clear that some legal reform is required to address bribery
in the global pharmaceutical industry in 2017. Delaying action is sim-
ply not an option, as maintaining the status quo will only lead to more
of the same kinds of unethical behavior.
Though my policy prescriptions as to the direction that FCPA
enforcement should take in 2017 are admittedly somewhat lofty, they
do not seem to be manifestly unreasonable. In fact, with the proper
85 See Barr, supra note 70.
86 See Johnston, supra note 1.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See Cassin supra notes 9, 21, 48, 52, 73.
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political climate and degree of motivation, each could be implemented
without much upheaval. Further, it is not difficult to see the pro-
foundly positive effects such changes might have. By fundamentally
altering the calculus that a pharmaceutical company must consider
before directing its company to bribe, it is possible to reduce the seem-
ingly insatiable temptation to solicit bribes in order to gain an edge
over the competition. In sum, implementing a more robust FCPA en-
forcement regime will have wide-ranging benefits, chiefly the creation
of a more ethical pharmaceutical industry that re-directs its focus to
where it ought to be: developing and providing the best possible medi-
cations to as many patients as possible.
